MODULE 3: PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS CONCEPT IN THE CONTEXT OF UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

Preparatory Notes to Instructors

AIM

To familiarize peacekeeping personnel with:

- POC as it relates to peacekeeping in the context of *Operational Concept on the Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations.*

- . The understanding of the critical concepts of POC in mandate language.

- Understanding of key challenges associated with the POC in complex environments

AUDIENCE

This module was designed for an operational level audience who has solid knowledge on the field mission organization and functioning, and how it interacts with mission partners on the ground. For a tactical level audience (for example, Contingent and Battalion Commanders and Battalion staff), this subject is also highly relevant; however, learning outcomes and content should be suited to the trainees` profile.

Specific Participant Profile:

- Military - Battalion level and above
- Police – FPU Commanders and above
- Civilian – Heads of Substantive Sections and above

LEARNING OUTCOMES

On completion of Module 3, participants will be able to:

1. Explain the DPKO/DFS Operational Concept on the Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. ("Tiers" and "Phases" and how they are connected)

2. Identify key challenges associated with the protection of Civilians in complex environments.

TRAINING SEQUENCE

Modules 1-4 are to be delivered in sequence, followed by the scenario based exercises.

DURATION

Module 3	Lecture/Presentation	Questions/Discussion & Session Assessment
Core content	40 min	10 min
Activity	20 min	10 min

Methodology

- The following points outline a suggested methodology. Experienced instructors may choose to use alternative methods and activities to present the material and key messages in this unit.

- Training takes 45 minutes in total.

- This module will include lecture issues followed by group questions/discussion and learning activities as appropriate.

Part 1: Presentations using the provided PowerPoint slides.

Part 2: Informal question and answer periods (as determined by instructor)

Part 3: Activity 3.1

INSTRUCTOR PROFILE

Module 3 is best presented by an instructor who has personal experience in a peacekeeping operation with a POC mandate, with a solid understanding of the operational concept of POC and how it's implemented in the mission(s). The Instructor should have undergone a formal training course on POC at national or international level.

INSTRUCTOR PREPARATIONS

Required Readings:

- Charter of the United Nations
- United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines (also known as the Capstone Doctrine)
- OCHA/DPKO Study on the Protection of Civilians in the Context of UN Peacekeeping Operations: Successes, Setbacks and Remaining Challenges (2009)
- DPKO/DFS Operational Concept on the Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations
- DPKO/DFS (Draft) Framework for Drafting Mission-wide Protection of Civilians (POC) Strategies in UN Peacekeeping Operations
- OCHA Aide Memoire for the Consideration of Issues Pertaining to the Protection of Civilians
- DPKO/DFS Lessons Learned Note on the Protection of Civilians in UN Peacekeeping Operations
- Carana Case Study and Scenario materials
  - Carana Training Pack
  - Country Study Overview
  - Scenarios

Equipment:

- Computer and provided session slides.

- Projector and screen for slides.

Materials:

- Copies of the *Draft Framework for Drafting Mission-wide Protection of Civilians (POC) strategies in UN Peacekeeping Operations* (one per participant). For copies, please download the electronic file at:

  http://www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org/PBPS/Pages/Public/Home.aspx

- Selected Carana Mission Materials – Mandate, Rules of Engagement, and Concept of Operations (Students should be provided with copies of these well in advance of POC training.

PARTICIPANT PREPARATIONS

All participants must have a strong familiarity with the following:

- POC Pre-Deployment Training: Participant Handbook.

- Carana Case Study Materials provided;

- DPKO/DFS Operational Concept on the Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations;

- DPKO/DFS (Draft) Framework for Drafting Mission-wide Protection of Civilians (POC) Strategies in UN Peacekeeping Operations.

ADDITIONAL RESOURCES

Security Council Resolutions (please download from http://www.un.org/en/documents/):

- Concerning Children and Armed Conflict, (S/RES/1612), 2005.

- Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, (S/RES/1674), 2006.

- Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, (S/RES/1894), 2009.

- Women and Peace and Security, (S/RES/1325), 2000.

- Women and Peace and Security, (S/RES/1960), 2010.

MATERIALS REFERENCED IN THIS MODULE

- DPKO/DFS Draft Framework for Drafting Mission-wide Protection of Civilians (POC) strategies in UN Peacekeeping *Operations* (2010)

- DPKO/DFS Operational Concept on the Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (2009)

- DRAFT Explanatory Note on Protection of Civilians Language in Security Council Mandates for Peacekeeping Missions

- Henry L Stimson Center, Military Planning to Protect Civilians: Proposed Guidance for United *Nations* Peacekeeping Operations, Washington, D.C, (2011)

- Integrated Mission Planning Process Guidelines: Role of the Field; Integrated Planning for UN Field Presences

- Mission Start-up Field Guide for Senior Mission Managers of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (2008)

- OCHA Aide Memoire for the Consideration of Issues Pertaining to the Protection of Civilians

- OCHA/DPKO Study on the Protection of Civilians in UN Peacekeeping Operations (2009)

- DPKO/DFS Guidelines for Integrating a Gender Perspective into the Work of the United Nations Military in Peacekeeping

SYMBOLS LEGEND

|	
☞	Note to the Instructor (Some background information for consideration and mention)
🗨	Speaking Points (The main points to cover on the topic. Ideally the speaking points are presented in the instructor's own words versus being read to participants. Please note, text in the slides is highlighted in bold, blue fonts in the associated speaking points.)
🏴	Mission Specific (A point where the session will benefit from mission specific information
e.g	Example (Stories that illustrate a point or key message)
?	Sample questions (A list of potential questions to pose to participants)
🗒	Handout (Indicates a handout is provided to participants at this point)
🎥	Film (A film that is suggested as either a core or optional activity)
📡	Core Learning Activity (An activity that is strongly recommended for inclusion)
+📡	Optional Learning Activity (An activity that can be used if there is time and it is appropriate for the participant group. Guidelines for these activities are provided at the end of the unit or part – as indicated in the text)
⚷	Key summary points (Key messages that are worth repeating at the end of the session. Alternatively, the instructor can ask participants what are the main messages they are taking from the session. Instructors can then fill in any points that have been missed.)

Session Notes

1. INTRODUCTION

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> ## Contents
>
> ❑ **Range of POC Activities: The Three "Tiers"**
>
> ❑ **Four "Phases" of Protection Response**
>
> ❑ **Challenges in the Implementation of POC**

2. RANGE OF UN POC ACTIVITIES: THE THREE "TIERS"

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> ## Range of POC Activities
> ## The Three "Tiers"
>
> ❑ **Tier I - Protection through Political Process**
>
> ❑ **Tier II - Protection from physical violence**
>
> ❑ **Tier III – Establishing a protective environment**

💬 The Operational Concept describes three "tiers" of protection activities that should be deployed simultaneously. These tiers encompass the full range of protection tasks outlined in SC mandates.

Tier I - Protection through Political Process

- Support to political processes (including peace negotiations and agreements, support to the development of governance institutions and the extension of state authority) which seek to establish a safe, secure environment where human rights are respected.

- Conflict management and support to reconciliation (can include local-level conflict resolution, as well as national or regional processes that seek to address past conflict and restore confidence and community stability.)

Tier II - Protection from physical violence

- Establishing deterrent presence through forward field military and civilian deployments and day and night patrols in vulnerable communities and targeted locations (such as markets or schools).

- Taking pro-active actions to reduce the vulnerability of civilians through heightened human rights monitoring, political dialogue, conflict mediation and pressure and engagement with potential aggressors, as well as the establishment of physical defensive positions or cordons (e.g. around a community or refugee site) and joint protection teams.

- Responding to violent attacks with all necessary means including, if necessary, the use of force, to protect civilians and stabilize the situation.

Tier III – Establishing a Protective Environment

- Creating conditions conducive to the delivery of) humanitarian assistance.
- Promotion and protection of human rights.
- Reduction of forcible displacement and creating of conditions suitable for return.
- Reform to the police, judicial and defense sectors of the host country, as well as DDR.
- Mine action activities.

3. FOUR "PHASES" OF PROTECTION RESPONSE

Slide 7

💬 The strategic framework talks about phases of protection. These phases are **not sequential**, but rather should be understood as four organizing concepts which might operate simultaneously depending on the range and nature of the threats.

Phase 1 – Assurance/Prevention:

💬 Ongoing throughout the course of the   mission deployment. Activities designed to demonstrate to the population that the mission is present, aware of the prevailing treats and circumstances, and prepared to take action to protect them.

- Presence, patrols (and use of force if necessary to protect during the course of routine patrols – failure in this regard undermines the credibility and – therefore – effectiveness of deterrence).
- Human rights monitoring.
- Conflict prevention and mediation.
- Advocacy with armed actors, government forces and other potential parties to the conflict in order to affirm their responsibilities under international human rights and

humanitarian law, and show them that the mission is going to witness and report violations.

Phase 2 – Pre-emption:

💬 When the level of threat escalates or where preventive activities are no longer enough.

- Intensified political pressure and advocacy with parties to the conflict in order to diffuse tension and prevent violence.

- Increased strength and visibility of military or police presence.

- In some instances, limited punitive strikes/offensive operations (against negative forces with a known history of attacks against civilians, and that have given the mission reasonable belief that they are preparing to strike again) … this both weakens the threat, and fortifies the credible threat that is necessary to make deterrence effective.

(e.g) *Example:*

A famous example of a lost opportunity to PRE-EMPT a violent attack took place in Rwanda in 1994. At the time UN Force Commander General Romeo Dallaire had credible information (reasonable belief, based in intelligence, history, and context) that there was a weapons caches being built up in preparation for the perpetration of violence against particular groups of civilians. In Gen Dallaire's case he did not have a Chapter VII mandate and did not have UN permission to intervene.

***However**, if – under a Chapter VII POC mandate – you were faced with a similar situation it would be within your mandate to take all necessary measures, up to and including the use of deadly force of necessary, to raid the weapons cache and pre-empt the attack that was being planned against the civilian population.*

Phase 3 – Response:

💬 When a threat of physical violence becomes apparent and efforts to pre-empt that threat have failed or can be reasonably assumed to be insufficient, more active

measures are needed. At this stage, the violent behaviour is already underway and steps must be taken to compel the aggressor to comply. This may require both physical protection efforts and heightened political engagement at the local, national and – possibly – the international level (H.L. Stimson, Military Planning To Protect Civilians, p. 12).

Phase 4 – Consolidation:

🗨 This is the stabilization of a post-crisis situation when the   peacekeepers need to assist the local population and the host authorities to return to a state of normalcy.

- Liaison activities.
- Documenting and investigating human rights abuses etc.
- Facilitating humanitarian access and/or creating conditions conducive to the return of refugees and IDPs.
- Re-establishment of ties between the community and governance institutions (including security institutions) where necessary (and possible).

☞ **Notes to Instructor:** *Preventative action and the deterrence of violence is the most effective form of POC.*

☞ *Effective deterrence is based on a demonstrated (and perceived) capacity, capability and willingness to use force.*

☞ *The effective **prevention** and **deterrence** of violence against civilians requires an effective early warning system and a consistent, credible and proactive (as opposed to reactive) operational approach and a mobile posture." (e.g. MOBs improved mission reach, enhanced deterrence and response capabilities.*

☞ *Though the "phases" as described in the Strategic Framework relate primarily to Phase II (physical protection) activities actors operating primarily in Tiers I*

and III must adjust their activities to reflect changes and escalation of the real-time challenges in the mission's area of responsibility.

Learning Activity 3.1:

Identifying POC Challenges and Responses

Learning Activity Time Required:

20 minutes for small group discussion and preparation of POC strategy

10 minutes for presentation of the strategy (responses to the questions)

Total time: **30 minutes**

Activity Guidelines:

The purpose of this activity is to illustrate the relationship between the three "Tiers" of protection activities and how those change throughout the four "Phases" of escalation. Refer to:

- Divide the participants into groups.

- Distribute Instructions, Reading and the Chart to be filled out (Annexes A, B, and C)

- Ask each group to think about the discussion of Tiers and Phases, and to answer the following questions;

1) **What are the threats/problems facing civilians in Rwanda at this time?**

Possible Answers (not exhaustive):

o Food and water running out (food insecurity)

o "Tens of thousands" of civilians being displaced (Internally and to surrounding countries)

o Targeted, pre-meditated violence against civilians (murder)

o Roadblocks

o Humanitarian access is very limited

2) **What activities should the mission have taken BEFORE violence broke out? What efforts should the mission be making to be address current problems? What steps should the mission take after the violence subsides?** Ask participants to fill in the chart (Annex B) with the activities they identify.

☞ *Note to Instructor:* Remind participants that the PHASES are **NOT SEQUENTIAL** and activities from each phase may need to be taken simultaneously to address different aspects of the problem. **

Sample Answers - Four Phases of Protection (THIS IS NOT EXHAUSTIVE)

	Phase I: Prevention	Phase II: Pre-Emption	Phase III: Response	Phase IV: Consolidation
Tier 1: Protection Through Political Process	- Support to the implementation of political peace processes - Conflict mediation and advocacy with parties to the conflict	- Political pressure, dialogue, dialogue and efforts to diffuse hostility	- Intensified political pressure and negotiation of ceasefires	- Initiation of support to community reconciliation efforts
Tier 2: Protection from Physical Violence	- Patrolling and deterrence through presence - Monitoring of ceasefires	- Establishment of protective cordons, roadblocks and other mobile preventive deployments	- Use of all necessary means to repel and defeat attacks on civilians and to defend the mandate	- Re-establishment of wide area security and support to the re-establishment of host state authority
Tier 3: Establishing a Protective Environement	- SSR and Justice sector reform efforts - Monitoring human rights abuses followed by preventive advocacy with spoilers	- Targeted DDR - Engagement with potential aggressors	- Support to the deployment of local security actors (police, local military) - Maintenance of a human rights monitoring capacity	- Ensure humanitarian access and protection of aid workers and assets

# 4. CHALLENGES IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF POC CONCEPTS

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"Civilian": Determining Who the UN Peacekeepers are Mandated to Protect:

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💬 UN Peacekeepers are expected at all times to make a clear distinction between civilians and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives. (SG's Bulletin)

💬 Under IHL, civilians are "protected persons" – they cannot be targeted and their life and dignity must be respected. Civilians are presumed not to directly participate in the hostilities and are therefore entitled to full protection from attack. Civilians lose this protection only if, and for as long as, they "directly participate in hostilities." (SG's Bulletin)

💬 The simple possession of a weapon does not necessarily give a person the status of "combatant". Civilians who are in possession of arms (for example, for the purpose of self-defence and the protection of their property, etc.), but who have not been, or are not currently engaged in "hostilities" are entitled to protection.

💬 If, however, those individuals instigate violence against another individual or group, or if there is *reasonable belief* (based on historical precedent and/or reliable intelligence) that they are preparing to commit violence then those individuals are no longer entitled to protection.

Slide11

(e.g)

EXAMPLE: Civilian/Combatant Distinction

There is sometimes confusion with regards to the status of armed men in the cattle camps of southern Sudan. Most of the time these individuals can be considered "armed civilians" but on occasion they have been known to take action that can reasonably be called "hostilities" and as such, can sometimes also be classified as "combatants"

(S/2010/528, Paragraph 27) "With the onset of the rains there has been a general decrease in inter-tribal violence, particularly cattle raids and conflicts over water and grazing areas. However, inter-communal tensions have remained high in some areas, fuelling several attacks. A major cattle-raiding incident involving local communities in Yirol East County and Yirol West County in Lakes State on 4 August left 30 dead. Conflicting Dinka and Shilluk land claims in Upper Nile State also remain a significant concern."

Remaining Impartial:

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Remaining Impartial

- ❑ **"Impartiality" is not the same as inaction.**
- ❑ "Impartiality" means that all civilians, will be protected without prejudice and according to risk. This includes the civilian dependents of armed actors.
- ❑ Some civilians may have greater **protection needs** than other groups. It might APPEAR that peacekeepers are giving preferential treatment to those groups.
- ❑ Human rights reporting and Public Information activities can help prevent misunderstandings and the perception of preferential treatment.

💬 **"Impartiality" is not the same as inaction.**

💬 In the case of protection, "impartiality" means that all civilians, regardless of ethnicity, religion, political affiliation, gender, economic or social status will be protected without prejudice and according to risk. This includes the civilian dependents of armed actors.

💬 In many conflicts one or more groups of civilians may be more vulnerable and have greater protection needs than other groups. As such, even if protection efforts are distributed strictly according to need, it might APPEAR that peacekeepers are giving preferential treatment to those groups. This can undermine the perceived impartiality of the mission.

💬 Professional, balanced and accurate human rights reporting as well as clear, consistent Public Information activities - including expectation management and good

communication with local communities about mission activities, priorities and motives - can help prevent misunderstandings and the perception of preferential treatment.

☞ *Note to Instructor: It is important to protect (within capabilities) all civilians at risk, even if this results in a misperception that some groups are receiving preferential treatment. This misperception should then be mitigated with a good public information strategy.*

Maintaining Host Country Consent:

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💬 The impartial protection of civilians can become politically challenging when civilians are being attacked by host state authorities, or by individual members of host-state institutions (for example, individual soldiers acting without the authority of their commanders). Protection of civilians from host state actors can compromise the consent of the host state for the deployment of the peacekeeping mission. However, INNACTION in the face of host state violations can undermine the legitimacy of the peacekeeping mission in the eyes of the civilian population.

💬 Peacekeepers operating with a Chapter VII protection of civilians mandate have the authority to intervene – including, if necessary, with the use of force – to protect civilians under imminent threat of violence from all sources, including host state authorities.

💬 In reality, peacekeepers must balance this authority with the reality that peacekeeping missions depend upon the **strategic consent** of the Host country in order to operate. Strategic consent at the level of the national authority does not guarantee the consent of regional or local arms of the host state government. Peacekeepers must consider **local dynamics as well as regional and national dynamics** when taking decisions regarding forceful intervention in the activities of host state actors.

💬 Peacekeepers must also consider the **consequences of inaction** and the effect of inaction on the mission's legitimacy and credibility in the eyes of the civilian population. Strong legitimacy and credibility amongst the civilian population can act as a political buffer where host state authorities might otherwise react strongly against the actions of the mission. Here again, effective human rights monitoring and public information campaigns, and constant dialogue between the mission and local communities, authorities, and regional and state level government is critical to the maintenance of legitimacy and consent.

💬 From the outset of the mission Senior Mission Leadership and UN commanders must communicate clearly with their counterparts within the government and the host country security forces their intention to fully implement their mandate to protect civilians within their area of operations.

☞ *Notes to Instructor: If the host state perceives that peacekeepers are acting against the interests of the state (or of powerful individuals or institutions within the state) then the host government might **withdraw consent** for the peacekeeping mission, and ask the Security Council to withdraw the mission from the country.*

☞ *Maintaining the consent of the sovereign authority (the host state government) is a critical legal consideration for a peacekeeping operation. However, national, regional and local actors (both government and non-government) may have different interests and perceive the presence and activities of the peacekeepers in different ways. Loss of consent at the regional or local level*

may not result in the mission being asked to withdraw from the country, but it can have serious operational consequences.

☞ *Political manipulation of the local population, barriers to freedom of movement, and attacks on the peacekeepers by forces loyal to the regional or local authority or particular local groups are some of the possible consequences of the lack of regional or local level consent.*

☞ ***It may not be possible for peacekeepers to maintain the consent of all parties and actors at all times,*** *particularly as some of those actors will be responsible for the very violations that the peacekeepers have been sent to address.*

☞ *Difficult political conditions are implicit in peacekeeping environments and are not an excuse for inaction. However, peacekeepers—civilian, military and police—must all be aware of the prevailing political conditions and interests within their area of responsibility and take these into consideration when planning POC activities.*

Possibility of Retaliatory Attacks:

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Possibility of Retaliatory Attacks:

❑ **The FAILURE to act can result in loss of legitimacy and the value of the mission as a deterrent**

❑ **Need to to assess the possibility of retaliatory attacks**

❑ **Need to be prepared to counter any increase in violence against the peacekeepers themselves or 'soft' targets**

❑ **Need to be prepared for possibility of population displacement**

🗨 The **FAILURE** to act can result in loss of legitimacy and the value of the mission as a deterrent. However, wherever the mission employs the use of force steps must be taken in advance to assess the possibility of retaliatory attacks and to ensure that peacekeepers are prepared to counter any increase in violence against the peacekeepers themselves or 'soft' targets such as humanitarian actors and the local population, as well as the possibility of population displacement and its associated consequences.

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Likely Targets of Retaliatory Attacks

❑ Peacekeeping installations, patrols, checkpoints or other peacekeeping deployments;

❑ Local communities—in particular, local actors, groups or communities;

❑ Refugee or IDP sites;

❑ UN Country team staff or installations, or other international organizations.

🗨 This includes the possibility of targeted attacks against;

- Peacekeeping installations, patrols, checkpoints or other peacekeeping deployments;

- Local communities—in particular, local actors, groups or communities that are perceived to have informed or assisted the peacekeepers;

- Refugee or IDP sites;

- UN Country team staff or installations, or other international organizations that are perceived to be associated with the peacekeepers.

🗨 Following the use of force it may also be necessary to initiate political efforts to maintain host country consent, or the consent of certain local communities.

5. SUMMARY OF KEY MESSAGES

The **Operational Concept** describes three "tiers" of protection activities that should be deployed simultaneously. These tiers encompass the full range of protection tasks outlined in SC mandates:

- Tier I - Protection through Political Process;
- Tier II - Protection from physical violence
- Tier III – Establishing a protective environment.

The three **"Tiers"** encompass both mission and non-mission (NGO, host state, etc.) roles and capacities.

Strategic framework talks about **phases** of protection. These phases are **not sequential**, but rather should be understood as four organizing concepts which might operate simultaneously depending on the range and nature of the threats.

- Phase 1 - Assurance/prevention
- Phase 2 - Pre-emption
- Phase 3 - Response
- Phase 4 - Consolidation

Distinguishing between Civilians and Combatants

- The simple possession of a weapon does not necessarily give a person the status of "combatant." Civilians who are in possession of arms (for example, for the purpose of self-defense and the protection of their property, etc.), but who have not been, or are not currently engaged in "hostilities" are entitled to protection.

- If, however, those individuals instigate violence against another individual or group, or if there is *reasonable belief* (based on historical precedent and/or reliable intelligence) that they are preparing to commit violence then those individuals are no longer entitled to protection.

Challenges:

- **Remaining impartial**: "Impartiality" is not the same as inaction. In the case of protection, "impartiality" means that all civilians, regardless of ethnicity, religion, political affiliation, gender, economic or social status will be protected without prejudice and according to risk;

- **Maintaining the consent** of the sovereign authority (the host state government) is a critical legal consideration for a peacekeeping operation. However, national, regional and local actors (both government and non-government) may have different interests and perceive the presence and activities of the peacekeepers in different ways;

- **Possibility of retaliatory attacks**: The FAILURE to act can result in loss of legitimacy and the value of the mission as a deterrent. However, wherever the mission employs the use of force steps must be taken in advance to assess the possibility of retaliatory attacks and to ensure that peacekeepers are prepared to counter any increase in violence against the peacekeepers themselves or 'soft' targets such as humanitarian actors and the local population, as well as the possibility of population displacement and its associated consequences.

Learning Activity 3.1:

ANNEX A:

Participant Handout (One Page)

Read the excerpts from "**Anarchy Rules Rwanda's Capital and Drunken Soldiers Roam City" (Annex C - Donatella Lorch, New York Times, April 14, 1994)**

Based on the information that you gathered in the reading, answer the following questions:

1) What are the threats/problems facing civilians in Rwanda at this time?
2) Based on your answers for question #1 (and taking into account the information provided below) what activities should the mission have taken BEFORE violence broke out? What efforts should the mission be making to be address current problems? What steps should the mission take after the violence subsides? (Fill in the chart - Annex B- with suggested activities)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

The Mission has a UN Security Council mandate – under chapter VII of the UN Charter – to;

- Use all necessary means to protect civilians under imminent threat of violence;
- Protect United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel;
- Facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance, including by helping to establish the necessary security conditions;
- Monitor the human rights situation.

The mission has the following types of staff;

- Military staff (with good mobility and sufficient numbers)
- Formed Police Units (armed)
- Civilian Police (unarmed)
- Civilian (including Human Rights, Civil Affairs, Political Affairs, and Child Protection Officers)

NOTES:

- Remember that the PHASES are NOT SEQUENTIAL and activities from each phase may need to be taken simultaneously to address different aspects of the problem.
- Assume that you have all the resources that you require.

  (The objective of this exercise is to identify the RANGE of activities that a UN peacekeeping operation might reasonably engage in, NOT to discuss the minutia of how to execute those activities. You will have the opportunity to discuss HOW to carry out these activities in the Scenario portion of this training.)

Learning Activity 3.1:

ANNEX B: Chart

	Phase I: Prevention	Phase II: Pre-Emption	Phase III: Response	Phase IV: Consolidation
Tier 1: Protection Through Political Process				
Tier 2: Protection from Physical Violence				
Tier 3: Establishing a Protective Environment				

Learning Activity 3.1:

ANNEX C: Reading

(EXCERPTS) ANARCHY RULES RWANDA'S CAPITAL AND DRUNKEN SOLDIERS ROAM CITY

(NY Times: http://www.nytimes.com/1994/04/14/world/anarchy-rules-rwanda-s-capital-and-drunken-soldiers-roam-city.html?pagewanted=3)

By Donatella Lorch (PUBLISHED: APRIL 14, 1994)

"Food had run out, drinking water was scarce and the streets of this capital city, empty of residents, was a terrifying obstacle course today of drunken soldiers and marauding gangs of looters dressed in a patchwork of uniforms, armed with machetes, spears, bows and arrows and automatic weapons.

Children carried hand grenades, and open-back trucks, loaded with angry men waving weapons at passing cars, sped through the city. As night fell, screams could be heard coming from a church compound where more than 2,000 Rwandans had taken refuge. A short time later, after the sound of machine-gun fire, the screaming stopped.

As tribal and political violence that began last week continued unabated, with tens of thousands of deaths reported, the evacuation of foreigners, most of them Belgians, was completed today by Belgian troops. Rwanda is a former Belgian colony. The French and Belgian troops were still at the airport but were to leave on Thursday in accordance with an ultimatum by rebel troops that required all foreign soldiers to be out of Rwanda by midday.
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"Tens of thousands of refugees who left the city during the past few days still lined the road south toward neighbourhood Burundi, walking with little more than the clothes they wore and a few bags. Although the thousands of rotting bodies that have littered the streets were cleared up with bulldozers and trucks on Tuesday, the streets of each neighbourhood are barricaded by roadblocks -- some belonging to the Rwandan Army, others to the presidential guard and still others to looters."
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"About 30 Red Cross workers and a half-dozen members of Doctors Without Borders are the only relief workers left in the city. Besides distributing food, the Red Cross brought in surgical teams and five trucks with 25 tons of medical equipment by convoy from Bujumbura, Burundi. Starting Thursday the Red Cross planned to set up its own hospital in Kigali as well as help pick up the wounded from churches.

The doctors also brought a surgical team, but it has been difficult for them to work here. On Tuesday the Hutu radio station accused the Red Cross of using its convoys to help only Tutsi wounded. The Red Cross suspended operations for a day until the radio rescinded its broadcast.

'We haven't been able to evacuate the wounded to a hospital," said Mr. Gaillard. "It is not possible to go everywhere because fighting is high. They have been gathered in churches and many haven't eaten for six days or a week. Trucks will go out with food to the churches tomorrow and try and bring the wounded to the hospital. I hope the international community and the donors will not forget this little country in Africa and will come once more to help the people.' "